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INTRODUCTION
Disputing states may select from a variety of resolution
mechanisms to manage their conflicts—bilateral negotiations, nonbinding third-party mediation,1 or international arbitration and
adjudication.2 Of these mechanisms, arbitration and adjudication
have often proven to be the most effective means of producing longlasting settlements on contentious issues. Despite this fact, evidence
indicates that states are generally reluctant to use such legal forms of
dispute resolution, especially in resolving issues of national security.
To understand when policymakers can and should promote the use
of these mechanisms, they need to understand the reasons behind the
reluctance of states to use arbitral or legal forums. Recent research
provides insight into the political dynamics underlying the use of

* Stephen E. Gent, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1 See Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Leverage and Conflict
Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 (2013); Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive
Results: Why Mediation Appears to Fail but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L
AFF. 27 (2013); J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature
on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013); Molly M. Melin,
When States Mediate, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 78 (2013); Isak Svensson, Research
on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 17 (2013).
2 U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1.
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international arbitration and adjudication—insights that will aid
policymakers charged with resolving such disputes.3
International arbitration and adjudication share three general
characteristics. First, a third party, not the disputants, determines the
terms of any settlement.4 Second, unlike mediation, states agree to
honor the ruling before the third party actually hands down a
decision. Finally, the arbitration or adjudication settlements
incorporate principles of international law that are not necessarily
invoked in other types of negotiations.5 The two methods primarily
differ with respect to the identity of the third party.6 In arbitration, an
individual, state, NGO, or panel of states hands down a decision. On
the other hand, adjudication is conducted by an international court,
such as the International Court of Justice.
While arbitration and adjudication are often viewed as legal
instruments, it is important to view the use of such procedures as
being part of a political process. In disputes over contentious issues,
states are primarily interested in achieving outcomes that protect their
3 See generally Krista E. Wiegand & Emilia Justyna Powell, Past Experience,
Quest for the Best Forum, and Peaceful Attempts to Resolve Territorial Disputes, 55 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 33 (2011); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Decision Control
and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, 55 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 710 (2011); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Bias and the
Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict Management Mechanisms, 28 CONFLICT MGMT. &
PEACE SCI. 124 (2011); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, The Effectiveness of
International Arbitration and Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, 72 J. POL. 366 (2010);
Richard B. Bilder, Adjudication: International Arbitration Tribunals and Courts, in
PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 195266 (I. William Zartman ed., U.S. Institute of Peace Press rev. ed. 2007); Sara
McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul R. Hensel, International Institutions, and Compliance with
Agreements, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 721 (2007); Todd L. Allee, & Paul K. Huth,
Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover, 100
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 219, 219-234 (2006); Beth Simmons, Capacity, Commitment, and
Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial Disputes, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 829
(2002) (describing recent studies in political science on legal dispute resolution of
territorial and maritime issues).
4 Franz Cede, The Settlement of International Disputes by Legal Means—
Arbitration and Judicial Settlement, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 358-59 (Jacob Bercovitch et al. eds., 2009).
5 Id. at 360.
6 See id. at 358-75.
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own security and economic interests. Thus, even though decisions of
arbitration panels or international courts are largely based on legal
principles, the initial decision to pursue arbitration or adjudication
represents a voluntary, political commitment. The tension inherent in
the use of a legal procedure to resolve a political dispute has often
constrained the use of arbitration and adjudication in the
international system.7 This article examines how the political frame
helps policymakers understand when and why states would be willing
to use international arbitration to resolve disputes over contentious
issues.
I. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARBITRATION AND
ADJUDICATION
Despite a tendency to compare these processes legally to their
domestic counterparts, international arbitration and adjudication are
carried out in a different environment. Without a global police force,
international courts and arbitration panels do not have the same
ability to enforce legal rulings as domestic governments.
Nevertheless, international arbitration and adjudication have proved
remarkably effective. Studies have shown that these legal dispute
mechanisms are significantly more successful at resolving
international territorial, maritime, and river disputes than other
bilateral and third-party conflict management mechanisms.8 Table 1
presents historical data on the outcome of attempts to settle
territorial claims in the Americas and Western Europe collected by
the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project.9 Sixty-three percent of
the time, arbitration or adjudication ends the claim between the
JOSEPH PRESTON BARATTA, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
IMPROVING ITS ROLE IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 26 (1989). See generally F.S.
NORTHEDGE & MICHAEL D. DONELAN, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE
POLITICAL ASPECTS (1971).
8 See Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 368-69; Gent & Shannon, Bias and the
Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict Management Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 127-28.
9 See generally Paul R. Hensel, Contentious Issues and World Politics: The
Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 81
(2001); PAUL R. HENSEL & SARA MCLAUGHLN MITCHELL, THE ISSUE
CORRELATES OF WAR (ICOW) PROJECT, http://www.paulhensel.org/icow.html.
7
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disputants. On the other hand, bilateral negotiations and mediation
have a success rate of less than twenty percent. What drives this
remarkable difference in success rates?
Table 1. Effectiveness of Different Conflict Resolution
Procedures in Settling Territorial Disputes Between Countries
Arbitration
and
Adjudication

Mediation

Bilateral
Negotiations

Did Not End
Territorial Dispute

14
(36.8)

116
(81.7)

286
(82.7)

Ended Territorial
Dispute

24
(63.2)

26
(18.3)

60
(17.3)

Total

38
(100.0)

142
(100.0)

346
(100.0)

Source: Issue Correlates of War; includes all territorial claims in the Americas and
Western Europe, 1816-2001. Percentages in parentheses.

There are several reasons why states are often willing to
comply with international arbitration and adjudication despite the
lack of traditional law enforcement. First, arbitrators and adjudicators
usually use principles of international law as the basis for their
decisions. Thus, when a state rejects such a ruling, it is also rejecting
well-established legal code. States may respect legal rulings in order to
help preserve the general legitimacy of international law. Second, the
legality of arbitration and adjudication generates international
reputation costs. These rulings are perceived by the rest of the world
as being legitimate because they are founded in legal provisions
agreed to by the global community.10 Thus it can damage a country’s

See generally Dana D. Fischer, Decisions to Use the International Court of
Justice: Four Recent Cases. 26 INT’L STUD. Q. 251(1982).
10
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reputation when it chooses to break a binding agreement.11 Finally,
arbitration and adjudication can provide political cover at the
domestic level. Domestic constituents and voters may perceive
concessions based on international law as being more legitimate than
concessions offered in bilateral negotiations.12 Thus, the arbitral and
adjudicative settlements may be more acceptable to a country’s
population, and disparate constituencies within the country, in the
long term than other types of settlements.
II. THE RELUCTANCE TO USE LEGAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
While arbitration and adjudication have proven to be highly
effective at resolving disputes, states are reluctant to use these
procedures. Table 2 presents data on the frequency of different types
of settlement attempts of territorial, maritime, and river claims.
Arbitration and adjudication combined only make up about six or
seven percent of settlement attempts. To understand why methods of
international legal dispute resolution are rarely used, one must
consider the unique characteristics of these procedures. Unlike
bilateral negotiations or other types of third-party diplomatic efforts,
arbitration and adjudication require states to give up decision control.
Decision control is the “degree to which any one of the participants
may unilaterally determine the outcome of the dispute.”13 In binding
arbitration or adjudication, an international court or arbitration panel
makes the final determination about the terms of any settlement.

11

See Mitchell & Hensel, supra note 3, at 723-25; Simmons, supra note 3,

at 843-44.
12 See Allee & Huth, supra note 3, at 222-23; Kyle Beardsley & Nigel Lo,
Third-Party Conflict Management and the Willingness to Make Concessions, 57 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. (forthcoming 2013); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS 61-62 (1990).
13 John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L.
REV. 541, 546 (1978).
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Table 2. Conflict Resolution Attempts by Type
and Disputed Issue
Type of Disputed Issue
Type of Conflict Resolution
Attempt

Territory River

Arbitration/Adjudication 38
(7.2)

Total
Maritime Attempts

7
(4.9)

16
(6.0)

61
(6.5)

144
(27.2)

48
(33.3)

89
(3.5)

281
(29.9)

Bilateral Negotiations

348
(65.7)

89
(61.8)

161
(60.5)

598
(63.6)

Total Attempts

530
(100.0)

144
266
(100.0) (100.0)

Other Third-Party
Attempt

940
(100.0)

Source: Issue Correlates of War project. Percentages in parentheses.

The requirement that disputants relinquish decision control
makes them reluctant to pursue legal dispute resolution. When
deciding whether to pursue legal dispute resolution, states must
weigh the trade-off between pursuing an effective conflict
management strategy and the costs of ceding decision control to a
third party.14 The following five factors significantly influence the
willingness of states to relinquish decision control and pursue
arbitration or adjudication:

Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 368-69.
14
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A. Third-Party Bias
Each party to a dispute will be reluctant to give up decision
control to an arbitration panel or court that it believes is biased
against its interests.15 A state may expect that such a biased third
party will hand down a ruling that disproportionately favors its
adversary. Given that one of the disputants would likely reject any
biased third party, disputants are generally only willing to jointly agree
to relatively unbiased arbiters or adjudicators.16
B. Salience
States are less willing to cede decision control when
negotiating over highly salient issues.17 An unfavorable ruling on an
issue of critical importance would be very costly, as state leaders
would be faced with the choice between living with an unpalatable
outcome and bearing the costs of reneging on a legal settlement.18
Given this, it is not surprising that arbitration and adjudication are
more commonly used to resolve less salient economic issues such as
investment disputes than more salient security issues like territorial
control.19 Moreover, within the universe of territorial and maritime
claims, states have been less willing to pursue arbitration or
adjudication on highly salient claims, such as those that involve
strategically located territory or valuable resources.20 For example,
despite the fact that Colombia and Venezuela have previously used
arbitration to resolve a territorial dispute, they have been reluctant to
do so over their disputed maritime boundary in Gulf of Venezuela

Id. at 375.
Id.
17 Gent & Shannon, Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict
Management Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 134.
18 Id. at 129.
19 See Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 730 n.2. See generally Todd
Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining
Over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 124 (2010) (discussing the use of
arbitration to resolve investment disputes).
20 See Gent & Shannon, Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict
Management Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 138.
15
16
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after the discovery of oil reserves in the 1960s.21 Similarly, while
Malaysia was willing to use the International Tribunal of the Law of
the Seas to resolve a maritime dispute with Singapore over land
reclamation in 2003, it recently avoided arbitration or adjudication to
resolve a disputed claim with Brunei over the rights to offshore oil
reserves.22
C. Uncertainty
Uncertainty about potential legal rulings also influences the
willingness to pursue arbitration or adjudication.23 A state will be less
inclined to give up decision control if it is highly uncertain as to the
terms of the settlement that it should expect from arbitration or
adjudication.24 As the nineteenth-century international law scholar
John Bassett Moore noted, “Governments are not in the habit of
resigning their functions so completely into the hands of arbitrators
as to say, ‘We have no boundaries; make some for us.’”25 Given this,
disputants generally only agree to pursue arbitration or adjudication
after they have successfully reached previous functional, procedural,
and substantive agreements on the issue at hand that decrease the
range of outcomes that could result from legal dispute resolution.26
D. Bargaining Power
The decision to pursue arbitration or adjudication is part of a
bargaining process between disputants.27 On issues of national
security, such as territorial conflicts, a state’s bargaining power is

Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 714.
22 Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case Concerning Land
Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor (Jan. 14, 2005),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1154.
23 Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 720.
24 Id.
25 LARS SCHOULTZ, BENEATH THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY OF U.S.
POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 117 (1998).
26 Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 721.
27 Id.
21

73

2013

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2:1

largely a function of its ability and willingness to pursue its goals
through military force.28 However, once states enter into arbitration
or adjudication, this source of power is no longer salient, as the terms
of any settlement will instead be a function of the strength of each
state’s legal claim.29 Since states with greater capabilities are better
able to guarantee favorable outcomes through negotiations or
military conflicts, they will be reluctant to opt for legal dispute
resolution unless they expect to receive a favorable ruling.30 For this
reason, arbitration and adjudication are less likely when there is a
large power asymmetry between disputants.
E. Armed Conflict
In general, the costs involved with the militarization of
conflict increase the incentive of states to resolve their disputed
claims. Thus, it is not surprising that arbitration and adjudication of
territorial, maritime, and river claims are more likely when there has
been a militarized interstate dispute on the issue in recent years.31
However, legal dispute resolution is rarely used as part of the peace
process of an armed conflict.32 In these situations, there is often a
lack of trust between the disputants that would be necessary for an
effective legal procedure.33 In addition, peace processes usually
revolve around multidimensional issues. Thus, disputants are
generally reluctant to give up decision control to a legal body during
peace negotiations because it reduces their ability to use issue linkage
to find a politically acceptable compromise solution to the conflict.
III. MOVING RELUCTANT STATES TO THE ARBITRAL
FORUM
Systematic analysis has shown that arbitration and
adjudication can be highly effective methods of resolving contentious
Id. at 719.
Id. at 719-20.
30 Id. at 719.
31 Id. at 727.
32 Id. at 713.
33 See Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 367.
28
29
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international disputes, but states are often unwilling to pursue such
legal procedures. Looking at the choice to pursue arbitration or
adjudication as a political decision provides policymakers with
concrete strategies to encourage the use of legal dispute resolution. In
particular, policymakers should focus on reducing the costs of giving
up decision control without undermining the unique benefits of
international arbitration and adjudication.
First, policymakers should find the historical shift from
arbitration by states to arbitration and adjudication by
intergovernmental organizations and courts to be a positive trend.
Disputants will likely perceive such organizations and courts as being
less biased than state actors, which will decrease the potential costs of
giving up decision control. For this reason, policymakers should
encourage the use of international courts and instill confidence in the
international community that such courts are unbiased. One practical
step would be to ensure that the methods used by international
courts to select judges for individual cases minimize the possibility of
a biased judge, such as a citizen of one of the disputing states.34
Second, policymakers can help minimize the costs of giving
up decision control by reducing the stakes and the level of
uncertainty in arbitration and adjudication. One potential approach to
doing this would be to encourage disputants to use incremental or
piecemeal binding negotiations to settle portions of their claim.35
Submitting to arbitration rulings over a series of smaller issues poses
less of a risk to disputants than a comprehensive ruling, as it provides
the ability to back out at various stages. While such an approach
would extend the negotiation process, if it encourages states that
would not otherwise do so to enter into a legal dispute resolution
procedure, it may prove to be a more effective long-term conflict
resolution strategy.
Finally, it is also important to emphasize legal dispute
resolution is not a panacea for all conflicts. States have multiple
Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of
Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 624 (2005).
35 See Larry N. George, Realism and Internationalism in the Gulf of Venezuela,
30 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 139, 162 (1988).
34
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avenues—from bilateral negotiations to non-binding mediation to
military conflict—to reach settlements over disputed issues.36 When
disputants opt for arbitration or adjudication, they must forgo these
other options. Since states with greater bargaining power are able to
guarantee themselves favorable outcomes outside of court, they will
be reluctant to submit their claims to arbitration or adjudication
unless they can expect a similarly favorable outcome. In the maritime
dispute with Brunei, Malaysian leaders recognized that they had a
weak legal claim and had little chance of a favorable outcome if the
case was submitted to arbitration or adjudication.37 Instead, Malaysia
opted for bilateral negotiations in which it was able to use leverage
and issue linkage to guarantee itself a future share of the oil and gas
revenues in the disputed maritime area.38
As mentioned above, a similar desire for flexibility and the
need to find compromises over complex, multidimensional issues
also makes states reluctant to give up decision control to a legal body
during peace negotiations of armed conflicts. The limitations of the
use of legal dispute resolution to resolve armed conflict were
apparent in the aftermath of the 2000 Algiers Agreement to end the
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in which the disputants agreed to
allow the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to demarcate their
border and arbitrate claims of international law violations.39 Ethiopia
rejected the arbitral decision that awarded the disputed border town
of Badme to Eritrea,40 and the reparations awarded by the PCA were
insufficient to resolve the political dispute between the states.41 Given
this, policymakers should focus on more flexible conflict
management mechanisms, such as mediation, that allow states to
maintain decision control in the immediate aftermath of armed
See Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 372.
37 Brunei and KL to Share Oil and Gas Revenue, THE STAR ONLINE, June 8,
2010,
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/6/8/parliament/642
1375.
38 Id.
39 Ari Dybnis, Note, Was the Eritrea—Ethiopia Claims Commission Merely a
Zero-Sum Game?: Exposing the Limits of Arbitration in Resolving Violent Transnational
Conflict, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 255, 259, 263 (2011).
40 Id. at 263.
41 Id. at 270-71.
36
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conflict, reserving arbitration and adjudication for situations in which
there is a reduced level of tension between the disputants.
In addition, evidence from territorial disputes indicates that
states are less likely to comply with legal rulings that do not reflect
the underlying balance of power between the disputants.42 For
example, a militarily superior Argentina rejected a 1977 arbitration
settlement of its disputed border with Chile in Beagle Channel.43
Given its power advantage, the Argentine government found the
arbitration ruling unacceptable and hoped to achieve a more
favorable outcome through other means.44 Thus, arbitration and
adjudication will be most effective when they produce settlements
that reflect the political realities on the ground. Understanding these
political factors can help policymakers determine when they should
promote the use of arbitration and adjudication, as well as when they
should turn to alternative methods of conflict management.

42 See STEPHEN E. GENT & MEGAN SHANNON, BARGAINING POWER
AND THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND ADJUDICATION 15-16 (Mar.

13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with International Studies Association).
This version of this paper was presented at the 2011 annual meeting of the
International Studies Association in Montreal, Canada (Mar. 16-19, 2011).
43 See DAVID R. MARES, VIOLENT PEACE: MILITARIZED INTERSTATE
BARGAINING IN LATIN AMERICA 136-37 (2001).
44 See id. at 137-38.
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